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Abstract
An increasing amount of E-health software packages are being bundled with Standard Query Language (SQL)
databases as a means of storing Electronic Medical Records (EMR’s). These databases allow medical
practitioners to store, change and maintain large volumes of patient information. The software that utilizes
these databases pulls data directly from fields within the database based on standardized query statements.
These query statements use the same methods as web-based applications to dynamically pull data from the
database so it can be manipulated by the Graphical User Interface (GUI). This paper proposes a study for an
investigation into the susceptibility of popular E-health software packages to code injection attacks that are
prevalent on web based applications. The proposed research also aims to examine the vulnerability of popular
Australian E-Health software to network based attack methods in a test environment. Attacks of this nature on
medical information systems have the potential to alter or destroy patient data, hold medical information
services ransom or even disclose sensitive patient information.
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INTRODUCTION
The risks associated with storing medical records electronically lies in the fact that there accessibility has been
increased. This increase in accessibility for legitimate users has provided opportunity for attackers to
compromise the integrity of these once tangible records. Like all data stored within computer based information
systems, Electronic Medical Records (EMR’s) can be attacked using the same platform/service specific
methodologies and techniques used to compromise, modify or destroy other data.
These platforms that are used by medical record systems are typically a database or data store utilising Standard
Query Language (SQL) technologies. These SQL technologies are susceptible to injection based vulnerabilities
where malicious code is “injected” into legitimate channels. SQL injection attacks being plainly the input of
arbitrary SQL code into an application with a malevolent goal. The vulnerability does not exist in the underlying
SQL architecture and in fact most injection based attacks rely on valid functioning of the SQL syntax. Many of
the vulnerabilities that these attacks target exist within the front-end/user interface of these systems.
The front end of a computer based information system typically refers to the Graphical User Interface (GUI)
which is what the user inputs commands and receives output via. However the front-end is often only a single
part and often small part of the system. In the case of records management software the backend SQL database
engine is the device that stores the data. In terms of EMR software this front-end typically consists of input
fields that directly interact with the SQL database via web based or web enabled interface. If inputs are not
properly sanitised into these input fields they have the potential to interact with the database to a level that is
only limited by the attacker’s knowledge of SQL injection attacks (Halfond, Viegas and Orso, 2006).
These attacks can enable insertion, modification or deletion of SQL structures and artefacts. Due to the
widespread use of SQL for database systems across a wide range of applications and industries there exists a
variety of readily available tools to exploit them. The article “SQL injection tools for automated testing”
(Beaver, 2006) demonstrates how freely available tools can scan for and exploit vulnerabilities on susceptible
target by a user with basic Windows skills. On a vulnerable system the tools in question have the potential to
automate an entire SQL injection attack in the hope of achieving absolute control over the database culminating
in its corruption or ultimate destruction and possibly even full administrative control of the underlying server.
There has been extensive research and investigation conducted in the field of SQL injection. There is even
material available on the platforms of database this research intends to experiment with, Microsoft SQL Server
2000 and 2005. However the majority of the current research is focused on penetration testing in web based
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applications using SQL systems. Within the field of research in medical information security there is certainly
an awareness of the risks associated with storing medical records electronically (Williams and Mahncke, 2005;
Valli 2006). It should be noted that the area of application package penetration testing within this field is largely
unexplored.
The two EMR software packages that have been chosen for the proposed study are the Health Communications
Network’s (HCN) Medical Director and Best Practice by Best Practice Software Ltd. Medical Director has been
chosen for the study due to the fact it has a market share of over 80% in the General Practitioner (GP) patient
management software market (Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts, 2006).
Best Practice is however a relative newcomer to the market as it was only released in 2004. It should be noted
Best Practice was developed by a team under the guidance of Dr Frank Pyefinch who co-developed the original
Medical Director software. Best Practice does not dominate the market like Medical Director however it does
claim to be an advertisement free alternative to HCN’s popular product (Helman, 2006).

ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORD SECURITY
Adopting computer based medical information systems to store the once paper based medical record has ignited
discussion into whether or not our medical information is safe. This discussion has lead to research into what
risks are associated with storing Electronic Medical Records (EMR’s) and also the awareness of these risks
amongst the medical fraternity.
The paper “The Underestimation of Threats to Patient Data in Clinical Practice” (Williams, 2005) investigates
the security risks associated with storing medical information electronically and how they these risks are
underestimated by medical practices. This brings to attention the need for security safeguards in medical
practices in Australia and how education on the topic of EMR security is a worthy cause. The concerns
presented in the above paper can be justified by anecdotal evidence released from the General Practice
Computing Group in 2005 on the types of attacks medical practices have been subject to.
Similarly the feasibility and likelihood of common network based attacks occurring in a medical practice are
discussed in the paper “The Insider Threat to Medical Records: Has the Network Age Changed Anything”
(Valli, 2006). This paper makes light of the likelihood of network based attack to medical information systems
due to the fact that the amount of online communication by medical practices is increasing.
Also there has been research conducted in South Australia by Holzer and Herrman in 2002 which revealed
alarming results about the security of EMR’s. The research found that 37 of the 73 practices surveyed did not
protect patient data with even trivial precautionary measures as passwords. These findings which can be seen in
Figure 1 below are only part of a survey on IT infrastructure in general practices.
Do you have written policies or procedures for:

Yes

No

Using passwords for electronic patient data security

46

37

Ensuring unauthorised persons cannot access confidential patient
data when computers are left unattended

47

36

Maintaining a computer hardware and software register/ inventory

31

52

Routine maintenance and checking of the computer system

52

31

Implementing software upgrades

55

28

Electronic patient practice data backup

57

26

Staff access to the Internet

39

44

Staff use of e-mail

35

48

Virus protection

45

38

Figure 1 – Partial results from a survey of Practice Managers

E-HEALTH SOFTWARE
EMR’s are stored, accessed, retrieved and modified by users via Electronic Medical Record Management
Software (EMRS). Gradually E-health software is replacing paper based medical record systems. A review of
popular E-Health software in Australia was conducted in 2006 by the health industry magazine Australian
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Doctor. The review highlighted the fact that the majority of E-Health software in Australia is now bundled with
commercial database software to store EMR’s. Typically these databases are in the form of SQL or a similar
variant. This software is not just an ‘Ad-hoc’ mix of databases and makeshift interfaces. There has been a
standard developed to regulate the E-health software industry by the International Standards Organisation (ISO).
The standard ISO/TC 215 to regulate the Health Information and Communications Technology market to
enforce interoperability and compatibility of computer based medical information systems.
It has been cited in two articles, (Helman, 2006) and (Manktelow, 2004) saying that the E-Health software
Medical Director 3 by the Health Care Network has a greater than 80% share of the clinical practice software
market. Controversy initially arose when there was talk about Medical Director 3 using a Microsoft SQL
database. Specifically this was in regards to the Microsoft licensing costs. However the current version of
Medical Director 3 is packaged with Microsoft SQL Server Express which is the free version of the licensed
software. It should be noted that because it is free its performance is limited. Specifically this has got to do with
the size, performance and administration of the database.

MICROSOFT SQL SERVER
Microsoft SQL Server began as an effort between Sybase and Microsoft to create SQL Server 1.0 in 1989. This
was Microsoft’s first venture into the corporate database arena. In 1993 Microsoft and Sybase parted ways and
then in 1999 Microsoft completely re-wrote the code to SQL Server and released Microsoft SQL Server 7.0. The
current release by Microsoft is SQL Server 2005 (version 9.0). Aside from the proprietary version used large
scale corporate environments there is also Microsoft SQL Server 2005 Express Edition. The express edition is
free to download and deploy however it is only suitable in databases that are less than 4GB. Since it can be used
in smaller environments it is often packaged with record management software so users of this software can
avoid Microsoft licensing fees if they operate on a smaller scale.
Securing any SQL Server has always been an issue even from a simple user rights perspective on Local Area
Network (LAN) based systems. A LAN being a network of interconnected computers within close proximity of
one another. The propagation of the Internet and widespread adoption of it as a valid communication conduit for
business data further exacerbates the problem. Specifically there have been publicized exploits of the software
such as the SQL slammer worm. Robert Beverly of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology conducted an
analysis of the SQL Slammer worm in 2003 on how it was able to exploit a buffer overflow vulnerability and
autonomously replicate itself on Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000. The
result of this allowed an attacker to execute their own code and elevate privileges within the system so they
could potentially ‘own’ the database. The solution from the vendor for this vulnerability was the application of a
security patch by Microsoft.

SQL INJECTION
Structured Query Language (SQL), pronounced ‘sequel’ is a standardized language which is used to query
relational databases. SQL was developed in the 1970’s by IBM and is now both an International Standards
Organisation (ISO) and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard. Most ‘industry strength’
database systems will meet or exceed these standards.
SQL injection attacks being simply the input of arbitrary SQL code with malicious intent. These attacks can
only occur when the target application is vulnerable. Specifically these vulnerabilities are caused by input
validation and error handling deficiencies (O’Leary-Steele, 2007).
The syntax of SQL injection attacks is dependent on the platform of the targeted application. This is due to the
fact that different SQL database platforms have different query structures and rules. Currently the material that
is readily available on SQL injection focuses on Microsoft SQL Server and My SQL. The paper by Cerrudo,
2002 “Manipulating Microsoft SQL Server Using SQL Injection” gives platform specific examples on the
detection and attack methods of SQL injection. Even though the paper was published 2002 the syntax of the
methods discussed in the paper are still applicable with current versions of Microsoft SQL Server. Examples of
SQL injection on ‘POST’ and ‘GET’ variables within the HTTP protocol that drives web applications on
Microsoft SQL Server can be seen in figure 2 below. Web Applications use the ‘POST’ and ‘GET’ arrays to
store variable values between pages. SQL injection works by inserting SQL statements into input fields and the
applications Uniform Resource Locator (URL) which is from where these variables receive their values.

Page 82

Proceedings of The 5th Australian Information Security Management Conference

Function

Example

Check for a vulnerability

http://site.com/start.asp?id=’ OR 1=1--

Gathering information

http://site.com/start.asp?page=1&L=A'(select%20@@version)--

Adding a login

Exec sp_addlogin ‘name’, ‘password’

Finding a field value

‘x’ OR full_name LIKE ‘%Bob%’;
Figure 2 – Examples of SQL injection

SQL injection is classified into two main categories, Error Based SQL injection and Blind SQL injection. Error
based injection techniques are reliant on the application outputting informational error messages. Figure 3 shows
error based SQL injection being used to exploit a ‘GET’ variable which will output software information of the
host.

Figure 3 – An example of error based SQL injection
Blind SQL injection however has no reliance on error messages. A paper was published by the Imperva security
group in 2003 titled ‘Blindfoled SQL injection’. The authors, Maor and Shulman, expressed their concern that
many applications are reliant on the ‘Security by obscurity’ when it comes to security. This was implying that
just because an error message was not produced when processing input that the application is immune to SQL
injection. However, this is simply not the case as currently there exists an abundance of research and tools which
are based on blind SQL injection methods.
Classic examples of SQL injection include writing information to the database, reading hidden information from
the database and avoiding authentication mechanisms. Recent examples of attacks using SQL injection include
“Hacker Defaces Microsoft U.K. Web Page” (Ward, 2007) and “Hackers' deface U.N. site” (Keizer, 2007).
These two examples demonstrate that the threat of SQL injection is very real and is not limited to whitepapers
that simply analyse the topic such as “A Classification of SQL Injection Attacks and Countermeasures”
(Halfond, Viegas and Orso, 2006). There is readily available material that goes beyond the simple modification
of web-site material such as the paper “Advanced SQL Injection In SQL Server Applications” (Anley, 2002).
Published by a security consulting group in the United Kingdom where the research methods describe how to
access the internal network on which the database server is stored on.

NETWORK SECURITY TOOLS
If a vulnerability exists in service which is the result of a hack or bug, then there is a possibility it can be
exploited. The use of platform specific exploits encompasses the areas of gaining unauthorized access, denial of
service and code injection. Exploits can be downloaded, compiled and run individually or there are packages
available of pre-compiled exploits. One of the more popular packages is Metasploit. The article “Powerful
payloads: The evolution of exploit frameworks” (Skoudis, 2005) describes how Metasploit eliminates the need
for an attacker to write their own exploits for a specific system. As well as having an encyclopaedia type
resource of common exploits the framework also allows the user to customize the payload used in the attack. A
payload is the code that is triggered by the exploit where as the exploit is the software that capitalizes on the
flaw.
Conventional security measures such as firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) fail to negate the
possible vectors for these types of attacks to be successful. A firewall is a hardware or software device that
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protects a network from unauthorized access and an IDS is a system that detects unauthorized access, i.e detects
intruders. However SQL injection and exploit based attacks utilize flaws in the targeted platform to gain
legitimate access so it fails to raise any “red flags” within the system. SQL injection based attacks rely on the
SQL functionality within the application working properly. If one was to limit the SQL functionality for security
reasons then the application would not be able to take advantage of the SQL database either.

RISKS TO MEDICAL SYSTEMS
The use of the SQL injection and network based attacks on medical based information systems can lead to the
deletion and modification of integral patient data. The possible consequences of this could be catastrophic. If a
whole suburb’s medical records are deleted how will doctors know what medications patients have had adverse
reactions to in the past? If a just one part of a record is modified, such as a diabetic’s insulin dosage, the
ramifications could be fatal. There are also the legal implications of this data being compromised to be
considered when looking at the importance of securing these systems. If a public figure had an embarrassing
condition such as an STD on their EMR and this was leaked, then the organisation that was storing this data
could potentially be liable.
Attacks of this nature are not limited to the destruction or falsification of electronic data. There is the potential
for a ‘terrorist’ to hold electronic information at ransom. This is collectively known as a Denial of Service (DoS)
attack. This type of attack involves flooding a host with requests in the aim of preventing legitimate users from
accessing a system. Examples high profile of DoS attacks are discussed in an IEEE journal article “Denial-ofService Rip the Internet” (Garber, 2000). Hypothetically a method like this could be used during a conflict so a
hospital could not effectively treat its patients or even manage patient data such as a medication schedule. The
effects of SQL injection and network based attacks are not limited to the welfare of patients. Insurance
companies could potentially be targeted. A patient could alter a record about an injury that occurred in the
workplace just to falsify a compensation claim.
DoS attacks do not discriminate their victims based on background or cause. Typically victims are selected
using a ‘shotgun’ like approach. There is not a person behind a computer wanting to attack a certain
organisation but rather a network of computers known as a ‘botnet’ scanning Internet Protocol (IP) ranges for
vulnerable hosts. As soon as one is found an attempt to exploit it or even propagate a virus or a worm is made. A
‘botnet’ does not have sympathy to patients. If an SQL database that stores vital patient data is vulnerable it is
still considered fair game by a ‘botnet’.

PROPOSAL FOR FURTHER STUDY
The findings of the proposed research will clarify whether or not injection based vulnerabilities exist in popular
Australian E-Health software packages. It is hoped that through performing penetration testing on these popular
packages that the results will contribute to the body of research in medical information security. Since there is
no readily available material on the penetration testing of EMR software, this research will endeavour to raise
awareness on the possible vulnerabilities that not only could exist in the tested packages but also in other brands
of EMR software.
The tests that will be performed in the proposed study will include but are not limited to the list below.
•

Error based SQL injection testing.

•

Blind SQL injection testing.

•

Platform specific exploit testing.

The proposed research will not explore the consequences of any successful attacks but whether or not attacks
using select SQL injection techniques and network attack tools are in fact feasible on popular E-Health software.
It is hoped that this paper will provide future researchers with information concerning SQL injection based
attacks in a non web environment. This is due to the fact that a large portion of SQL injection research is
specific to the exploitation of ‘POST’ and ‘GET’ variables in browser based applications. To complement the
proposed experiments which focus on attacks through the input fields of the EMR software, this research also
aims to investigate the feasibility of using readily available network based attack tools to target the database
behind these applications.
The software companies that produce EMR software do integrate a certain level of security features into the
application package. In the case of Medical Director 3 and Best Practice this is in the form of password
protection and privilege restriction options of user accounts. It should be noted that there have been claims of
Systems Administrator (SA) password cracking being a trivial exercise (Litchfield, 2002). However those
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countermeasures fail to take into account the possibility of malicious attacks occurring outside the inbuilt
functionality of the interface.

CONCLUSION
The proposed research aims to find out if the confidential medical records in the Microsoft SQL databases
packaged with Medical Director 3 and Best Practice are vulnerable to SQL injection and network based attacks.
In the case of the proposed experiments returning results that would indicate vulnerabilities within the software
then it is hoped that this paper could serve as a warning about the possible risks associated with storing
electronic medical records. The possible targets for these types of attacks range from small scale medical
practices to large scale hospitals housing thousands of patient records. If the information on one of these targets
is destroyed, modified or held ransom then not only can the host machine be affected but the patients who have
their vital information stored on these machines could face disaster.
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